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The paper emphasizes three interrelated questions about the decline in relative 
farm to non-farm prices in the United States since 1973:  1) Is it unusual, 2) What 
caused it, and 3) Is it likely to continue?  We find that based on historical and 
international evidence this phenomenon may be considered unusual.  Separating farm 
price and income support in 1973 and growing relative productivity in agriculture has 
been the major contributor to changing the trend of the relative farm goods inflation.  
This trend is likely to continue based on predicted steady growth of relative 
agricultural productivity and continuation of direct payments and other forms of farm 
income support policies. 
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THE ROLE OF PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH AND FARMERS’ INCOME 
PROTECTION POLICIES IN THE DECLINE OF RELATIVE FARM PRICES IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
 





  High inflation has traditionally been one of major concerns among economic 
policy makers around the world.  But just as high inflation may be dangerous and 
disruptive to the normal functioning of an economy; the same can be said about very low 
inflation, which can lead at an extreme to deflation or a sustained decline in the aggregate 
price level.  It was noticed that the goods prices have been falling in the United States 
during last several years, while the services prices continue to rise (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics or BLS hereafter).  While the rise in services prices more than offset the decline 
in the goods prices thus keeping overall inflation positive, the trend caused some 
concerns among economists in the United States. (Clark, 2004) 
 
  An equally interesting trend to people who follow agricultural commodity (farm 
level) prices in the United States is the increasing gap between consumer prices measured 
by the Consumer Price Index (CPI), Producer Price Index (PPI), and prices of all non-
farm commodities on one side and the farm level agricultural commodity prices on the 
other side.  For more than thirty years now agricultural prices grew at a rate below the 
growth rate of any other price index in the United States.  This ultimately had to lead to 
the reallocation of resources, especially labor, that moved from agriculture to the sectors 
of the economy exhibiting more opportunities (services, for example). 
 
  This paper assesses whether the sustained slower growth of agricultural prices 
relative to other prices in the economy should be cause for concern among farmers or 
policy makers in the United States.  The analysis emphasizes three interrelated questions 
about the decline in farm goods inflation relative to other goods and services:  (1) Is it 
unusual, (2) What caused it, and (3) Is it likely to continue?   
 
The paper is organized as follows.  Second section examines the extent to which 
the last thirty years represent an experience unusual by historical and international 
standards.  Third section evaluates potential explanations for the presence of this 
sustained gap in inflation rates.  Fourth section reports results of empirical model. Final 
section concludes with an assessment of whether this gap is likely to persist or may be 
narrowed or widened in the future.  
 
___________ 
*Miljkovic is associate professor in the Department of Agribusiness and Applied 
Economics, NDSU, Fargo; Jin is assistant professor in the Department of Industrial 
Economics, Chung-Ang University, South Korea; and Rodney Paul is associate professor 
in Department of Finance, St. Bonaventure University, NY. 
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U.S. Historical and International Experience 
  Historically, farm prices in the United States have been analyzed and considered within 
agricultural sector and their relationship with other producer prices has not received much 
attention.  Thus in spite of the evidence presented in this paper that relative farm prices have 
been declining only after 1973 it is commonly emphasized that real farm prices were declining 
during the period 1920-1970 and after 1974 until today (Cochrane, 1958, 1985, 1986; Cochrane 
and Runge, 1992; Knutson, Penn, Flinchbaugh, 1998).  It is further argued that even in nominal 
terms there were long periods of declining and depressed prices.  For instance, the price of corn 
declined from $1.52 per bushel to $1.33 between 1950 and 1970, while the price of wheat fell 
from $2.00 per bushel to $1.33 during the same period (Bowens, Rasmussen, and Baker, 1984, 
p.45).  The only time of prosperous and favorable farm prices, according to these and other 
sources, was the period of the early 1970s, often compared to the golden years of agriculture 
(1910-1914).  This increase in farm prices came about due to reduced feed grain production (due 
to early frosts and corn blight) and increased export demand (Knutson, Penn, and Flinchbaugh, 
1998).  Increased export demand occurred due to a combination of factors: falling value of the 
dollar (following the adoption of floating exchange rate), the opening of Soviet Union’s borders 
to U.S. grain, and an increase in income in OPEC countries. 
    
  The above statements are of course true.  However, the relevant question that one ought 
to ask here is how did farm prices fare relative to other prices in the economy?  This is a relevant 
question because no sector performance over a long period of time can be meaningfully 
interpreted if it is isolated from the performance of other sectors or the economy overall.  For 
instance, while real prices may be declining in a sector for long stretches of time it is possible to 
observe similar trends in the rest of the economy or in some of the sectors.  Or maybe completely 
opposite situation is possible where prices in one sector are continuously higher in one sector 
than in the rest of the economy.  And one can see from figures 1 and 2 that farm prices did fairly 
well relative to other producer prices or consumer prices for over sixty years.  That trend 
changed in the mid 1970s becoming especially pronounced in the 1980s and 1990s when farm 
price index fell far below other producer prices as well as the CPI. 
 
While casual observation of Figure 2 indicates the presence of the change in growth of 
relative farm prices after 1973, a formal analysis is in order to confirm or reject such a 
hypothesis.  The relative farm price is defined here as the ratio of the non-farm commodity price 
index (NFCPI) and the farm price index (FPI).  Annual data for the period 1913 to 2003 are from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  While similar trends are recorded when CPI or PPI are used 
instead of the non-farm commodity price index to create the relative price index, we believe, 
given that NFCPI does not contain prices of services and is producer oriented, it provides more 
appropriate basis for further analysis that accounts for productivity or producer groups’ lobbying 
efforts.   
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Figure 1.  Farm Commodity Index, All Commodity Index, and the CPI 
 
 
Figure 2.  Relative Non-farm/Farm Prices 
 


















   Based on Perron’s (1989) analysis of non-stationary time series, the so called “changing 
growth” model is tested.  This procedure implies an exogenously determined time of break in the 
trend function.  Considering the fact that the time of break is assumed to be known in this case, 
i.e., 1973 was the year of major changes in farm policy; Perron’s approach seems to be 
appropriate.  Under the null hypothesis in this model, it is specified that the drift parameter 
changes at the time of the break.  Under the alternative hypothesis, a change in the slope of the 
trend function without any sudden change in the level at the time of the break is allowed.  The 
actual estimated regression is as follows: 
 
          ~     ~     ~   ~ 
  yt = µ + βt + γDTt*  + yt      ( 1 )  
 
    ~       ~ ~  k   ~  ~      ~ 
where     yt =  α yt-1 + ∑ ciΔyt-i + et,  
   
i=1 
 
and DTt* = t – TB (where TB refers to the time of break).  This procedure contains the lagged data 
and lagged first differences of the data as regressors in equation (1).  The regression is estimated 
by OLS.  The parameter k specifies the number of extra regressors added.  Since in this case we 
specified a simple AR(1) process, k equals 1.  Results are presented in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1. Test for a Unit Root 
________________________________________________________________________ 
       ~      ~     ~      ~        ~              ~ 




Farm Prices    89  1  0.685* 0.003*  0.008*   0.006*   0.005*     0.0631 
                   (38.09) (5.55)    (3.38)   (4.57)    (2.83) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: t-test results are in parentheses and * denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.   
 
Under the alternative hypothesis of stationary fluctuations around a deterministic 
breaking trend function, it is expected that µ ≠ 0, β ≠ 0, γ ≠ 0, and α < 1.  Our results conform to 
these expectations and all variables are significant at the 1% level.  Most importantly, expected 
change in the slope of the trend function without any sudden change in the level at the time of 
the break occurred, as indicated by coefficient γ. 
 
  The available international evidence indicates the decline in farm prices relative to other 
producer or commodity prices during last thirty years is U.S. phenomenon.  Of course, this is 
considering developed market economies of Europe, Oceania, and Canada.  In all of these 
economies one can see that farm and non-farm prices move together over time.  Figures 3 and 4 
illustrate the relationship between farm and non-farm prices in Australia and the United 


































































































Figure 3.  Australian Non-Rural less Rural Commodity Price 
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Figure 4.  UK Non-farm minus Farm Prices 
Source: http://www.economagic.com/em-cgi/data.exe/rba/grcprcusd   
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during the last 2-3 decades.  While these foreign economies experienced a falloff in farm 
commodities inflation during some years, they experienced sustained periods of a relative rise in 
farm commodities inflation during last a couple of decades. 
 
  After considering historical and international evidence about the behavior of the relative 
farm price index, potential explanations of this changing trend are evaluated next. 
 
 
Potential Explanations for the Presence of Sustained Gap in Inflation Rates 
  There are many possible explanations for the presence of sustained gap in inflation rates 
between farm commodities and both producer and consumer goods.  The potential explanations 
evaluated in this paper include: (a) an increase in productivity growth in the farm sector relative 
to the productivity growth in the rest of the economy, (b) escalating concentration (changing 
market structure) in non-agricultural sectors compared to the farm sector that remains to be by 
far more competitive, (c) rising demand for other goods and services relative to demand for farm 
products, (d) downward pressure on farm commodity prices due to the rising value of the dollar, 
increased global competition, and the size of domestic market relative to the overall production, 
(e) a deterioration in the accuracy of measured farm, producer, and consumer prices (index 
numbers), and (f) the effect of income and other farm protection policies on farm level prices. 
 
Changes in Productivity Growth 
The productivity increase in U.S. farm sector has been a well researched topic (e.g., 
Ahearn, Yee, and Huffman, 2002; Capalbo and Antle, 1988; Gardner, 1992; Huffman and 
Evenson, 2001).  According to U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), yields per crop acre, a 
measure of productivity, have risen 94 percent during the second half of the 20
th century 
(Penson, Capps, and Rosson, 1999, p.30).  Main reason for this rising productivity, according to 
USDA, has been the technological advances embodied in farm inputs via first advances in 
chemical industry and later in bioengineering.  Ball (2002) suggests alternatively that the net 
contribution of all inputs to growth in agricultural output over this same period (i.e., second half 
of the 20
th century) was less than one-tenth of one percentage point per year.  He finds that the 
responsibility for agricultural output growth is in total factor productivity.  Tweeten (1998) did 
not see the increase in productivity in agriculture as a factor that will contribute to the lowering 
relative farm prices in the future.  On the contrary, he suggested that supply growth may be 
slowing relative to demand, and if so, commodity prices would strengthen relative to other 
prices. 
 
  Agricultural sector, however, was not the only sector experiencing high growth rates 
during this period.  What is of ultimate interest here is the relative productivity growth rates, i.e., 
productivity increases in agriculture versus productivity increases in other sectors.  Numerous 
studies provide information about sectoral productivity growth rates in the United States (e.g., 
Jorgensen, Gollop, and Fraument, 1987; Jorgensen and Griliches, 1967; Jorgensen and Stiroh, 
2000; Stiroh, 2002).  Data on productivity growth by industry for period 1958-1996 in Table 2 




  Based on information from Table 2, productivity growth rates in agriculture were higher 
over a sustained period of time than all but three industries: electronic and electric equipment, 
industrial machinery and equipment, and textile mill products.  It is also important to note how 
two out of three industries with higher productivity growth rates than agriculture, i.e., electronic  
 
 
Table 2  Productivity Growth by Industry, 1958-1996_______               
Industry      Annual Productivity Growth (%) 
Agriculture       1.17 
Metal  mining       0.44 
Coal  mining       0.84 
Petroleum and gas      -0.44 
Nonmetallic  mining      0.46 
Construction     -0.44 
Food  Products        0.54 
Tobacco  Products    -0.20 
Textile  mill  products      1.23 
Apparel and textile       0.80 
Lumber  and  wood    -0.02 
Furniture and fixtures       0.56 
Paper  products       0.42 
Printing  and  publishing    -0.44 
Chemical  products      0.58 
Petroleum  refining      0.33 
Rubber and plastic       1.04 
Leather  products      0.28 
Stone, clay, and glass       0.41 
Primary  metals       0.22 
Fabricated  metals      0.65 
Industrial machinery and equipment   1.46 
Electronic and electric equipment   1.98 
Motor  vehicles       0.24 
Other transportation equipment     0.18 
Instruments       1.12 
Miscellaneous manufacturing     0.82 
Transport and warehouse     0.86 
Communications      0.88 
Electric  utilities       0.51 
Gas  utilities     -0.24 
Trade        0.98 
F I R E       - 0 . 1 8  
Services    -0.19 
Government  enterprises    -0.52 
Private  households      0.00 
General  government    -0.00      
 
 
Source: Jorgensen and Stiroh (2000, pp. 173-174), based on Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
and Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data.  
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and electric equipment and industrial machinery and equipment, are high-technology industries.
1 
In addition to the above information, Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2002) show that U.S. 
agriculture accounts for 21 percent of all U.S. growth in productivity over 1958-1999 (but only 
1.3 percent of gross domestic product), and it ranks in the top 4 of 37 sectors in average 
productivity growth over this period.  This information further strengthens our original 
contention that high relative increase in agricultural sector productivity contributes to lower 
relative farm sector prices.  However, farm sector’s increase in productivity has been above the 
national average for more than last forty years and still is above the average.  Thus it is not 
obvious that higher productivity in agriculture was the sole or even the main factor behind the 
relative falloff of farm prices during the last thirty years.  Moreover, productivity cannot explain 
the shift in trend of the relative price differential that occurred after 1973. 
 
Market Concentration Changes in Agriculture versus Non-Agricultural Sectors 
  One of the four key interrelated structural characteristics used when discussing 
competitive behavior of a market is the number and size distribution of sellers and buyers or 
market concentration.
2  Market concentration is traditionally measured by Herfindahl-
Hirschmann Index (HHI) or four-firm concentration ratio (C4) (e.g., Golan, Judge, and Perloff, 
1996; Lopez and Liron-Espana, 2003).  U.S. farming sector has traditionally been considered as 
the prime example of a perfectly competitive industry.  In spite of a dramatic change of the 
complexion of farming in the United States in terms of the number of farms during the post 
World War II period (i.e., the number of farms has declined from 5.6 million in 1950 to less than 
2 million in 2000 (Miljkovic, 2005)), farming sector market remained to be less concentrated 
than any other sector within the U.S. economy.  This is the fact not only because of the presence 
of a large number of farmers within the sector but also because of inability of one or a few of the 
farmers to affect the market price significantly.  The relevancy of this discussion becomes 
apparent when we remember that prices are lower in perfectly competitive industries than in 
other market structures. 
 
Concentration varies considerably across industries in the United States. In the household 
laundry equipment, breakfast cereal, and cigarette industries, the four largest companies produce 
well over 80 percent of the industry's product. At the other extreme the four largest firms in 
wooden household furniture, fur goods, and women's and misses' dresses sell well under 20 
percent. For all U.S. industries the average four-firm concentration ratio in 2000 was 37 percent. 
Weighted by industry sales, it was 36 percent. This average has been quite stable for a long time. 
In 1935 the average four-firm concentration ratio for U.S. industries was 40 percent; weighted by 
sales it was 37 percent. In 1977 the average was 37 percent, while the weighted average was 39 
percent. In other words, there has been no discernible long-run trend toward concentration in 
U.S. economy since the Great Depression (Gilligan, 2001). 
 
                                                 
1  The impact of intermediate inputs on productivity growth in the industrial machinery industry 
is very significant.  Note that a substantial portion of these inputs consists of semiconductors 
purchased from the electronic equipment industry. 
2 The remaining three characteristics are the degree of product differentiation, the extent of 
barriers to entry, and the economic environment within which the industry operates (Penson, 
Capps, and Rosson).  
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  In one of his classical papers, Shepherd (1982) suggests an increase in competition in 
U.S. industries between 1939 and 1980.  Shepherd defines four market types (structures): (1) 
pure monopolies, (2) industries with dominant firms, (3) tight oligopolies, and (4) effectively 
competitive industries. In Shepherd’s classification scheme, monopolies exist when one firm 
accounts for 100 percent (or nearly 100 percent) of an industry’s total sales.  No close substitutes 
for its product exist and entry to the market is blocked.  Industries with dominant firms are near 
monopolies.  In such industries, the dominant firm accounts for 50 percent to 90 percent of total 
industry sales, no close rivals exist, and entry to the market is difficult. Tight oligopolies are 
industries in which the top four firms account for over 60 percent of total sales and in which 
entry barriers are high. Shepherd lumps all other firms together in the “effectively competitive” 
category.  The classification “effectively competitive” signifies more than just perfect 
competition.  It also includes all of what is commonly described as monopolistic competition. In 
Shepherd’s effectively competitive group, the top four firms control less than 40 percent of the 
market, and entry barriers are low. 
 
Table 3, based on Shepherd’s estimates, shows what happened to the level of competition 
in the U.S. economy between 1939 and 1980. Pure monopolies, a category that includes most 
public utilities and some patented goods, accounted for only 2.5 percent of total national income 
in 1980, down from 6.2 percent in 1939. In fact, purely monopolistic and dominant-firm 
industries together accounted for just a little over 5 percent of national income in 1980. In 
contrast, 76.7 percent of national income originated in sectors that Shepherd classifies as 
effectively competitive, up from 52.4 percent in 1939. The estimates indicate that the percentage 
of national income originating in tight oligopolies was cut in half between 1958 and 1980. 
 
 
Table 3   Trends in Competition in the U.S. Economy, 1939–1980 
1939     1958     1980 
 
Pure monopoly     6.2     3.1     2.5 
 
Dominant firm     5.0     5.0     2.8 
 
Tight oligopoly     36.4     35.6     18.0 
 
Effectively competitive firms 52.4     56.3     76.7 
 
Total       100.0     100.0     100.0                      
 
Note: Percentage share of national income by industry category. 
 
Source: William G. Shepherd, “Causes of Increased Competition in the U.S. Economy, 1939–
1980,” Review of Economics and Statistics LXIV (November 1982), 613–626. 
 
  The U.S. economy has apparently become more competitive over the years. A 
number of factors may have contributed to this change. Without going into detail here, Shepherd 
concludes that these factors include, among others, increased competition from imports, 
deregulation, and enforcement of antimonopoly laws.  
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  Based on the above results it seems that one would come to expect lower prices in 
agricultural sector than in the rest of the economy.  However, market has been more heavily 
concentrated in non-agriculture than in agriculture during the entire period under consideration, 
i.e., from 1930s until today.  Also, the trend seems to be reversing, albeit slowly, with agriculture 
getting more concentrated and non-agriculture being at the same level, or according to Shepherd, 
getting less concentrated.  Therefore changes in market concentration in the United States do not 
seem to explain the trend of prices in agriculture falling relative to non-agricultural prices. 
 
Rising Demand for Non-farm Goods and Services 
  The past three decades’ falloff in farm relative to non-farm goods and services inflation 
might also be explained by an increase in the demand for non-farm goods and services relative to 
farm goods and services.  Over time demand for non-farm goods and especially services has 
grown more rapidly than demands for farm goods.  For instance, Clark (2004) determined that 
the share of nonfood and non-energy consumer spending devoted to services rose from 56 
percent in 1959 to 70 percent in 2003.  The spending for food, which may be used to 
approximate the spending for farm goods, decreased relative to spending for nonfood products 
between 1984 and 2002 from 15 percent to 13.21 percent (figure 5).  This very modest shift in 
the composition of demand was unlikely to raise the relative price of nonfood (non-farm) goods 
and services, even in the short run.  As it is known from the literature, the inflation effects of an 
increase in the relative demand for non-farm goods and services would be short-lived.  
Theoretically, only differences in productivity growth (or the quality bias in measurement) can 
account for persistent or long-term differences between goods and services inflation (e.g., De 
Gregorio, Giovannini, and Wolf, 1994).  Finally, it can be seen from the figure 5 that there was 




Rising Value of the Dollar, Increased Global Competition, and Relative Size of Domestic Market 
 
  Appreciation of the dollar, in principle, contributes directly to lower overall inflation by 
making imports cheaper, to the extent foreign producers pass the cost savings of the currency 
appreciation through to their U.S. prices.  A rising value of the dollar also contributes indirectly 
to lower inflation to the extent lower import prices and market competition push down the prices 
of U.S. produced goods.  As a cautionary note, recent evidence suggests that exchange rate 
movements might not have large effects on the domestic goods inflation (e.g., Bernanke, 2003; 
Taylor, 2000).  
 
The following question then can be asked: Are imports of agricultural goods considerably 
greater (relative to the amounts produced and marketed domestically) than imports of non-
agricultural goods and services?  If they are, a rising value of the dollar is likely to exert more 
downward pressure on agricultural goods prices than on non-agricultural goods prices.  As a 
result, increases in the value of the dollar could cause agricultural goods inflation to fall relative 




Figure 5.  Shares of Food and Non-food in U.S. Consumer Spending 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and authors’ calculations 
 
 
  The answer to the above question is pretty easy.  While the United States experienced 
overall trade deficit throughout most of the last forty years, and consistently after 1975 (Source: 
Economic Report of the President, various issues), agriculture exhibited exactly the opposite 
trend.  Indeed, the United States has been a net exporter of agricultural products since 1959, an 
uninterrupted span of 45 years (USDA-FATUS). This clearly indicates that the rest of the 
economy was, and still is, much more dependent on imports than agriculture.  Thus any 
appreciation of the dollar in the post Bretton Woods era was likely to affect non-agriculture more 
seriously that agriculture.   
 
  It is certain that heightened global competition due to GATT, WTO, many regional trade 
agreements, as well as due to market deregulations in many countries (Miljkovic and Paul, 2003) 
put some downward pressure on domestic prices.  Many observers have pointed to a rising 
volume of imports from such developing countries as China as a key source of downward 
pressure on goods prices (Rogoff, 2003).  It is also true that due to generally greater level of 
competition in the United States than in most other countries (Baily, 2001) the globalization may 
have more effects than in tightly regulated economies.  However the issue here is whether 
farming sector and prices have been more affected than other sectors and prices due to this 
increase in global competition.  Recalling that U.S. agriculture has been a net-exporter for more 
than thirty years now, there is no credible evidence pointing out to an increase in global 
competition as the cause of the relative farm price decline. 
 



















Deterioration in the Accuracy of Measured Farm and Producer and Consumer Prices (Index 
Numbers) 
The Producer Price Index (PPI) measures average changes in prices received by domestic 
producers for their output. Most of the information used in calculating producer price indexes is 
obtained through the systematic sampling of virtually every industry in the mining and 
manufacturing sectors of the economy. By contrast, the publication of indexes for the service 
sector of the economy, while expanding, is currently incomplete. The PPI program also includes 
data from other sectors as well—agriculture, fishing, forestry, and utilities (gas and electricity). 
As of January 2002, the PPI program contained the following indices: 
-  Price indexes for approximately 500 mining and manufacturing industries, 
including more than 7,000 indexes for specific products and product categories;  
-  More than 3,000 commodity price indexes organized by type of product and end 
use;  
-  Nearly 1,000 indexes covering approximately 90 industries in the services sector 
and other sectors that do not produce physical products; and  
-  Major aggregate measures of price change, including product durability and 
stage-of-processing (SOP) classification schemes.  
Together, these elements constitute a system of price measures designed to meet the need for 
both aggregate information and detailed applications, such as following price trends in specific 
industries and products. 
Known until 1978 as the Wholesale Price Index, or WPI, the PPI is one of the oldest 
continuous systems of statistical data published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS, the 
Bureau), as well as one of the oldest economic time series compiled by the Federal Government. 
When it was first published in 1902, the index covered the years from 1890 through 1901. The 
origins of the index can be found in an 1891 U.S. Senate resolution authorizing the Senate 
Committee on Finance to investigate the effects of the tariff laws upon the imports and exports, 
the growth, development, production, and prices of agricultural and manufactured articles at 
home and abroad.  The first index published, with base period 1890–99, was an unweighted 
average of price relatives for about 250 commodities. Since that time, many changes have been 
made in the sample of commodities, the base period, and the method of calculating the index. A 
system of weighting was first used in 1914, for example, and major expansions of the sample and 
reclassifications were implemented in 1952 and 1967.  
The PPI program’s original intent was to measure changes in prices received for goods 
sold in primary markets of this country. The conceptual framework and economic theory guiding 
the program’s evolution, while more implicit than explicit, concentrated on obtaining the price 
received by either a domestic producer or an importer for the first commercial transaction.  A 
major limitation of the traditional methodology was its reliance on judgmental sampling of  
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commodities and producers; that is, commodities and producers were selected without the use of 
probability-based statistical methods. This practice resulted in a system that was too heavily 
composed of volume-selling products made by larger firms. The PPI therefore did not adequately 
reflect the behavior of the multitude of products whose individual transactions values might have 
been small, but that collectively accounted for a sizable portion of the economy. Another result 
of judgment sampling was that the output of many industries was completely overlooked. Before 
the transition to the current methodology began, products covered by the PPI program accounted 
for only about half of the total value of output by the mining and manufacturing sectors. The 
practice of assigning equal weight to price reports from each producer of a given commodity, 
regardless of any disparity in size among these firms, may have caused some distortions.  
Another limitation of the traditional PPI methodology was its commodity orientation, which, 
while important, was not compatible with the industry orientation of most other Federal 
economic time series. The PPI’s unique commodity classification scheme made it difficult to 
compare producer price movements with data for most other economic variables that were 
expressed in terms of the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC).  
These and other weaknesses in the PPI program, combined with increased development 
of the theory of price indexes in preretail markets, spurred several changes in terminology and 
operations during the 1970s. The 1978 change in the program name from Wholesale Price Index 
to Producer Price Index, for example, was intended to reemphasize the fact that the PPI program 
continues to be based on prices received by producers from whoever makes the first purchase. 
Also in 1978, the new nomenclature was accompanied by a shift in the Bureau’s analytical focus 
from the All Commodities Price Index (which was popularly called “the” Wholesale Price Index) 
to the Finished Goods Price Index and the other commodity-based SOP price indexes. This 
overhaul was phased in gradually, until the transition to the current methodology was essentially 
completed in January 1986. 
Given that the farm price index is a part of the PPI program, all methodological changes 
and adjustments discussed about the PPI above are pertinent to the farm price index as well.  
Thus one cannot see the falloff of farm goods inflation relative to the non-farm producer goods 
inflation stemming from the difference in the accuracy of measured inflation.  This may not be 
so when we consider the falloff of farm goods inflation relative to consumer goods and services 
(measured by CPI) inflation.  According to Griliches (1994) and Nordhaus (2002) the 
measurement  of inflation is subject to biases attributable to difficulties in adjusting for changes 
in the quality of goods and services.  Moreover, they believe the measurement problem is 
considerably more severe for services than goods.  As a result, the overstatement of measured 
inflation, i.e., the quality bias, is widely thought to be greater for services than goods.  In light of 
this problem, one potential explanation for the falloff of farm goods inflation relative to CPI is 
that indexes of service inflation became even less accurate over the past three decades, due to an 
increase in the quality bias.  However, according to Triplett and Bosworth (2003), measurement 
of price and quality in the U.S. services sector has improved dramatically over the past a couple 
of decades.  This improvement would make deterioration in CPI measurement relative to the 




The Effect of Income and Other Farm Protection Policies on Farm Level Prices 
 
  Prior to the 1970 farm bill, supporting farm prices and incomes was not separated.  That 
all changed in 1973 when farm price and income support were finally separated.  While price 
support was provided by traditional Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) loans, income 
support was provided by direct farmer payments.  It is important to first establish that direct 
payments to farmers in the United States actually increased significantly since 1973.  Data in  
Table 4 on direct government payments to U.S. farmers is from the U.S. Department of  
 
Table 4.  Direct Government Payment to U.S. Farmers 
 
Year  Direct Payment  

































































Source: USDA-ERS Data Base 
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Agriculture, Economic Research Service (USDA-ERS) for the period 1974 to 2003, and indicate 
that payments on average doubled every year during this period.  In 1974, U.S. farmers were 
given direct payments of approximately $530 million, while that number in 2003 was almost $16 
billion.  The payment peaked at almost $23 billion in 2000. 
 
    
The motivation for increased direct payments in 1973 was to lower price supports to 
restore competitiveness in the world market (Knutson, Penn, and Flinchbaugh, 1998).  That was 
the time when farmers and government came to the realization that they are becoming more and 
more dependent on the world market in order to sell their products.  There have been several 
mechanisms of direct payments since 1973.  The target price mechanism was the first to separate 
price support from income support, i.e., target prices support only income.  A target price is the 
level of returns per unit of commodity on certain acreage guaranteed to farmers who participate 
in farm programs.  Target prices provide for direct payments to producers of the difference 
between the target price and the average market price whenever the average market price for a 
specified time period falls below the target price.  The difference between the target price and the 
average market price is called a deficiency payment (Gardner, 1992).  Target prices have been 
established for all major food grains, feed grains, and cotton as a means of supporting farm 
income. 
 
  Another direct payment mechanism is called the fixed payment.  It was initially 
established in the 1996 farm bill.  The idea behind this concept, unlike the target price, was to 
sever the production stimulating effect of direct payments.  The amount of the payment was 
predetermined annually for the life of the farm bill.  Producers were eligible for so called fixed 
production flexibility contract (PFC) payments independent of the production of specific crops.  
Another supplemental instrument called market loss assistance (MLA) payments was made 
available to the farmers under similar terms where a producer could not increase or decrease 
MLA payments by increasing or decreasing production. Since the size of the payment is not 
related to the market price, it is argued to have no effect on output, although the benefits still are 
capitalized into land values (Knutson, Penn, and Flinchbaugh, 2004).  However, Adams et al. 
(2001) suggested that even though the payments are fixed, they may increase production and 
thus lower market price.  This may be because frequent changes in farm policy may lead farmers 
to conclude that future payments will depend on current production decisions.  For more details 
on these and other direct payment mechanisms refer to Knutson, Penn, and Flinchbaugh (2004). 
 
  After establishing that farmers were major beneficiaries of government support policies 
during the last 30 years and after describing some of the mechanisms of the disbursement of 
these benefits, the critical question becomes why are the farmers so successful in attracting 
government support?  The answers may be found in a series of political economy papers 
including Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1996) and Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2002).  They 
all address the issue of why, in many developed countries, declining industries have lobbied the 
government repeatedly for different kinds of protection and support and how in most cases the 
governments provided the requested significant protection and support.  All of this is happening 
even, “long after conceding their nations’ loss of comparative advantage in these activities.” 
(Grossman and Helpman, 1996, p. 795). 
 
  The argument made by Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2002) seems to be especially 
applicable to the case of U.S. agriculture.  They argue that when a profitable or expanding  
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industry lobbies the government successfully for support, the extra rents are dissipated by an 
even larger entry than otherwise (i.e., without lobbying).  That will go on until the industry again 
earns only a normal rate of return.  If an industry is unprofitable or declining, success in similar 
lobbying/political activities would bring the rate of return closer to or at best up to the normal 
rate.  Thus, newcomers are not attracted to enter the industry and share the rents.  A different 
model of lobbying benefits applied to agricultural policies was proposed by Rutstrom and 
Redmond (1997). 
 
  Agriculture in the United States cannot be considered a declining industry based on its 
output growth.  As we saw earlier, agriculture has been one of the most productive sectors in the 
United States during last 30 years (Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000).  However, if measured by the 
number of employees (or number of farms in this case), agriculture may be considered a 
declining industry since that number declined from 5.6 million in 1950 to about 2 million in 
2000 (Miljkovic, 2005).  But one key feature of agriculture that limits entry into the industry is 
asset fixity or, more specifically, land fixity.  This is one input necessary in agricultural 
production, yet it is limited to available agricultural land and cannot be expanded beyond what is 
available.  Also, different crops cannot be grown in all agricultural areas due to climate.  For 
instance, if cotton or rice growers are successful in their lobbying efforts, the landowners in the 
agricultural states of North Dakota or Minnesota cannot switch from wheat or corn production 
(which are the most popular crops grown in these states) to cotton or rice production to share the 
rents because these two crops cannot be grown in the moderate or cold climate of the Upper 
Midwest. 
 
  Grossman and Helpman (1996) suggest how it is not rent dissipation but rather the 
potential for free riding that prevents the expanding industries to engage in costly lobbying 
activities.  The reason is that if an organized pressure group cannot prevent latecomers from 
entering the industry after a lobbying effort has been made and without contributing for its cost, 
then the early entrants will find little incentive to lobby in political equilibrium.  Given the asset 
fixity and possibility of no entry (or very limited entry at best) into agriculture, lobbying efforts 
within agriculture are not affected with the possibility of free riding.  Therefore, it comes as no 





  Empirical model is estimated in this section measuring the effect of relative productivity 
in the farm and non-farm sector and the increase in direct payments on relative farm prices.  
Given that microeconomic theory suggests relative productivity as the sole contributing factor in 
affecting relative prices and that we established that permanent changes in government support 
may be having an effect on relative prices as well, the estimated model here is fairly simple.  
Data for all three variables are available for the period 1949 to 2003.  Direct payments data are 
from the USDA-ERS data base, while data for the relative farm price measured by the ratio of 
the non-farm commodity price index (NFCPI) and the farm price index (FPI) are from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics and have been described in an earlier section.  Finally, relative 
productivity is measured by the ratio of manufacturing and farm productivity indexes obtained 
also from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  The estimated equation is as follows: 
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 RFP  =  β1 + β2RP + β3DP + ε.        ( 2 )  
RFP stands for relative farm prices, RP for relative productivity, and DP for direct payments to 
farmers.  The equation is estimated in log-log form in order to obtain estimates in elasticity form.  
An AR(1) term was added after the Durbin-Watson statistic in the original equation indicated the 
presence of serial correlation.  Both AIC and Schwarz criteria suggest the model with no lags.  
Results are provided in Table 5. 
   
Table 5 Regression Results. 
___________________________________ 
 
Variable   Coefficient 
___________________________________ 
 
Constant   -0.8791* 
   (-3.062) 
 
LOG(RP)   -0.6234* 
   (-5.148) 
 
LOG(DP)     0.0617* 
   (3.457) 
 
AR(1)      0.4957* 
   (3.096) 
 
R
2    0.9096 
 
Adj R
2    0.9037 
 
Durbin-Watson test  2.0681 
 
Inverted AR Roots  0.50 
____________________________________ 
 
Note: t-test results are in parentheses and * denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
Before interpreting the coefficients, we notice that the Inverted AR Root of 0.50 is well inside 
the unit circle and as such indicates a stationary AR model.  R
2 and the Durbin-Watson statistic 
are based on the one-period ahead forecast errors.  Based on R
2, the model seems to explain 
rather well the behavior of the relative farm prices. 
 
  All variables in the model are statistically significant at the 1% level.  Our primary 
interest is the size and the sign of the relative productivity and direct payments coefficients that 
may be interpreted as the elasticities.  Both estimated coefficients have the anticipated signs.   
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Since relative productivity was defined as the ratio of manufacturing and farm productivity 
indexes, a decrease in relative productivity (due to relatively higher growth of the farm 
productivity index) by 10 percent led to an increase in relative non-farm to farm prices by 6.23 
percent (due to relatively slower growth of the farm price index).  An increase in direct payments 
to the farmers, as a form of government support of agriculture, by 10 percent led to an increase in 
the relative non-farm to farm price index by 0.6 percent due to the relatively slower growth in 
farm than non-farm commodity prices.  While both coefficients are significant, it is obvious that 
fast productivity growth in agriculture was the primary contributor to the declining relative farm 
prices.  Impacts of government policies, however, cannot be ignored.  Finally, as one would 
expect, the carry-over effect of historical relative farm prices on current relative farm prices is 
also significant, as indicated by the AR(1) coefficient. 
 
Implications for the Future and Conclusions 
  It was determined in the paper that the past three decades’ falloff in farm goods inflation 
relative to non-farm producer goods and services is a U.S. phenomenon.  Multiple causes for this 
phenomenon were contemplated, and both theory and empirical evidence suggest that increase in 
relative agricultural productivity and income directed farm policies are main reasons for the 
occurrence of this trend in relative prices. The resulting question before us becomes: is the 
differential between non-farm and farm prices more likely to remain (or further increase) at an 
elevated level or decline in the period ahead?  Recent technological advances in bioengineering 
contributed to a significant, and still lasting, productivity growth in agriculture.  The same trend 
is expected to continue.  As one could see, agriculture already experienced much higher 
productivity growth rates than the rest of the economy in last several decades.   Thus relatively 
high productivity growth rate in agriculture are likely to keep high or even further increase the 
difference between prices of non-farm goods and services and farm commodities. 
  At the same time, agricultural lobbying in the United States has traditionally been among 
the most successful lobbying efforts in attracting government support.  We hypothesized that, in 
addition to increasing relative productivity of agriculture, U.S. government support of the 
agricultural sector significantly contributed to the sustained decline of farm prices relative to 
non-farm prices.  However, our results indicate that although the size of the government policy 
effect is relatively small, it is statistically significant. This implies that government policies 
directed towards directly supporting farmers’ incomes still contribute to the observed trend in 
relative prices. 
 
  This result has some very interesting implications.  While the political economy 
background of the increase in direct payments and government support to farmers can be 
determined, it is very difficult to rationalize this type of behavior from the purely public policy 
point of view.  By increasing direct payments to the farmers, government encouraged continuous 
overproduction in the sector and misplacement of resources, in particular labor.  Moreover, 
continuous overproduction in the sector due to direct (income) payments to the farmers may have 
been less effective in increasing producer income, as increased production leads to lower market 
prices and returns (assuming relatively inelastic demand for agricultural commodities).  On the 
flip side of this argument one could conclude that some of the benefits of the direct payments to 
the farmers have been transferred to consumers via lower prices.    
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  There are some other possible implications of this type of government policies that have 
not been in the focus of the analysis specifically but are nevertheless important and as such 
deserve to be mentioned.  If production indeed increased due to increases in direct (income) 
payments to the farmers, that may have had detrimental environmental consequences.  This is 
especially true if new production came from environmentally marginal or most vulnerable land.  
Also, the United States declared to the World Trade Organization (WTO) that PFC payments fall 
under the category of so-called “green box” and as such result in minimal distortions of 
agricultural markets.  Our results indicate that it is not quite clear that these payments are truly 
production neutral.   
 
  The effects of this “bad policy” on relative prices are relatively small, and the main 
damage from the policy comes from the misuse or suboptimal spending of budgetary funds, and 
possibly through environmental degradation of agricultural land.  On the other hand, the 
argument made by farm communities and rural development specialists is that these programs 
have never been designed to conform to economic principles, but rather to serve and protect rural 
America and its way of life.  The cynical side-effect of this argument is that the biggest 
beneficiaries of this government policy are the largest farmers that happen to be, in most cases, 
corporate farms that have nothing to do with rural America and its way of life.  The largest 
beneficiary of the USDA’s subsidy programs received over 533 million U.S. dollars in income 
payments between 1995 and 2004, while top four recipients of direct income payments totaled 
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